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SUMMARY
Although the compartmentalization of poultry industry components has substantial economic
implications, and is therefore a concept with huge significance to poultry industries worldwide,
the current requirements for compartment status are generic to all OIE member countries.
We examined the consequences for potential outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in
the British poultry industry using a metapopulation modelling framework. This framework was
used to assess the effectiveness of compartmentalization relative to zoning control, utilizing
empirical data to inform the structure of potential epidemiological contacts within the British
poultry industry via network links and spatial proximity. Conditions were identified where,
despite the efficient isolation of poultry compartments through the removal of network-mediated
links, spatially mediated airborne spread enabled spillover of infection with nearby premises
making compartmentalization a more ‘risky’ option than zoning control. However, when zoning
control did not effectively inhibit long-distance network links, compartmentalization became a
relatively more effective control measure than zoning. With better knowledge of likely distance
ranges for airborne spread, our approach could help define an appropriate minimum inter-farm
distance to provide more specific guidelines for compartmentalization in Great Britain.
Key words: Avian influenza, mathematical modelling, notifiable infectious diseases, Susceptible-
Infected-Removed (SIR) model, veterinary epidemiology.
INTRODUCTION
Within the context of controlling notifiable livestock
disease epidemics, the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) stipulates that ‘establishing and main-
taining a disease-free status throughout the country
should be the final goal for OIE members’ (chapter
4·3, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code [1]).
However, these guidelines also recognize the difficulty
in ‘establishing and maintaining a disease-free status
for an entire territory’ and therefore promote the ben-
efits of establishing and maintaining subpopulations of
animals with a distinct health status. These subpopu-
lations are usually defined through zoning (or regiona-
lization), where geographical boundaries separate
parts of a territory (or country). An example is the im-
plementation of control zones used to enforce move-
ment restrictions and enhanced biosecurity measures
during outbreaks of notifiable disease [2].
The relatively recent concept of compartmentaliza-
tion extends this idea by considering pathways other
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than geographical proximity that may jeopardize the
biosecurity of a compartment. The OIE guidelines
stipulate that ‘the definition of compartment may re-
volve around disease-specific epidemiological factors,
animal production systems, biosecurity practices, infra-
structural factors and surveillance’ (chapter 4·4, OIE
Terrestrial Animal Health Code [3, 4]). These, gen-
erally speaking, non-spatial factors include the move-
ments of animals, equipment, other fomites, feed and
people. Biosecurity considerations will also include
spatial proximity to adjacent animal populations; in
this respect compartmentalization is comparable to
zoning control.
The major benefit of compartmentalization is the
potential continuation of exports from compartments
during an outbreak (upon agreement with the trade
partners) and it is this economic aspect that is driving
the growing interest in European Union Member
States, and their poultry and swine production indus-
tries, in adopting this concept [5]. Compartmentaliza-
tion is also a means of outbreak prevention by
minimizing spatial- and fomite-mediated mechanisms
of spread and can facilitate the eventual elimination of
disease by concentrating personnel and resources in
areas where elimination is most likely to succeed [6].
Compartmentalization is not conceptually new
given that, historically, disease control programmes
have been based on the concept of disease-free herds
or flocks [3]. However, compartmentalization has
not yet been formally appraised, nor has it been
applied, so currently there are no examples of success
and any potential associated risks are difficult to
determine. Appraisal is made all the more difficult
because the requirements for compartment status are
not specific, yet it is recognized that the implemen-
tation of both compartmentalization and zoning will
be influenced by factors specific to the pathogen, in-
dustry and country in question [6].
Of particular concern for governments worldwide
in relation to commercial poultry production is the
global spread of avian influenza, particularly in its
highly pathogenic form (HPAI). The OIE has pro-
duced guidelines on the practical implementation
of compartmentalization for avian influenza and
Newcastle disease (which is another important notifi-
able disease of poultry) [7], with consideration of the
specific risks of entry and spread of avian influenza.
A better understanding of the potential epidemiologi-
cal links, both through spatial proximity and through
movements of people, vehicles and equipment [8–10],
could help provide a more specific definition of
compartmentalization for the British commercial
poultry industry.
Given the current lack of appraisal of the applicat-
ion of compartmentalization, and the potential need
to refine the definition under different disease, indus-
try and country-specific circumstances, we aim to pro-
vide an example modelling framework developed to
investigate the risks of infection leakage from compart-
ments within the British commercial poultry industry.
We focus our analyses on integrated poultry com-
panies (premises with common ownership) as they
are suitable candidates for compartmentalization due
to the vertical integration of their business [6]. We
explore a range of outbreak scenarios, characterized
by their basic reproduction number (R0), in order to
provide a quantified measure of risk under compart-
mentalization in comparison to that under zoning
control.
METAPOPULATION FRAMEWORK
Network characterization
The Poultry Network Database (PND) was collated in
2006 by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (now
known as Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories
Agency; AHVLA) and describes the poultry premises
(n=4067), which are the clients of major slaughter-
houses (SH; n=96) and catching companies (CC;
n=102) within the Great Britain (GB) commercial
poultry industry [8, 11]. These SH–client and
CC–client associations were assumed to represent a
potential epidemiological link representing the risk
for pathogen spread via fomites during on-farm
catching-team visits, particularly during flock-
thinning which is carried out mid-production cycle
(i.e. risks via personnel, clothing, equipment, forklift
trucks, slaughterhouse vehicles). We note the activity
of catching teams is recognized to be relevant to the
potential risk of avian influenza spread within the
GB poultry industry [8, 12].
We define a poultry company as a group of multiple
individual premises under common ownership which
make up the individual components of a compart-
ment; these individual premises we denote multi-site
(MS) premises. Overall, MS premises status was
highly correlated with membership of an integrated
company (Pearson’s product-moment correlation co-
efficient=0·92, 95% CI 0·91–0·93, P<0·0001). We
generated a bipartite network where premises and
SHs (or CCs) represented nodes and the SH–client
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(or CC–client) associations informed the links be-
tween the nodes. This network characterization was
then used to generate an unweighted and undirected
unipartite network where a single set of nodes repre-
sented poultry companies and links represented shared
SH or CC associations (see [13]). If at least one prem-
ises from each of two companies shared a SH (or
CC), the respective companies were deemed to be
associated.
Figure 1 shows that the company-level GB poultry
network was highly connected forming one giant com-
ponent (consisting of 91% of premises in the PND).
The network giant component represents the largest
of all possible components [15]. Each individual
node within a giant component can reach all other
nodes via at least one path, providing an estimate
for the maximum possible epidemic size for networks
representing disease transmission [14, 15]. This high
connectivity has important implications for the nature
of epidemiological risks that should be considered in
the definition of compartmentalization for GB.
The topological properties of a network can be
quantified by a number of measures. The most widely
used measures the centrality, or importance, of the
network node. The degree centrality, in its most com-
mon form, measures the total number of nodes
directly adjacent to each node [16]. Other measures
consider network paths; these quantify the routes
across the network from one node to another via
each link, e.g. the betweenness centrality quantifies
the number of shortest paths between pairs of
nodes [17].
In this study we used degree and betweenness as
measures of network centrality computed using
Pajek v. 2.04 software [18]. The network giant com-
ponent could be divided into two main subgroups:
(i) a core group of companies with relatively high
degree centrality, some of which also had relatively
high betweenness (see inner nodes circled in red with
degree centrality, normalized by the largest value,
>0·6, Fig. 1), and (ii) a periphery group of companies
with both relatively low degree and betweenness cen-
tralities (see outer nodes with degree, normalized by
the largest value, <0·6, Fig. 1). We used these network
links between companies to inform a metapopulation
model of HPAI transmission with connections be-
tween two populations; one population represents
a company/compartment within the core network
group and the other represents a company/compart-
ment within the periphery network group.
Population structure
We aimed to capture the potential for spread between
MS premises (that are under common ownership, i.e.
a compartment) and other premises at risk of infec-
tion. As single-site (SS) premises tended to be spatially
clustered around MS premises (80–90% of premises
Fig. 1 [colour online]. Unipartite representation of the poultry company network of associations via slaughterhouses and
catching companies; n=41 poultry companies (excluding four that were unconnected to the giant component). Node labels
are the normalized (by largest possible value) degree centralities with relative magnitudes represented by node size. Nodes
circled in red represent companies which also had a relatively high betweenness centrality. The line widths represent the
number of slaughterhouses and/or catching companies that formed the associations.
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within the proximity of MS were SS premises across
distances of 1–10 km), we captured the potential for
transmission between MS and SS premises both with-
in and between the two compartment populations.
More specifically, each population comprised of the
MS premises of a single company and nearby SS pre-
mises. Hereafter ρ=1 denotes a company within the
network core group and ρ=2 denotes a company
within the network periphery group.
Interrogation of the PND showed that the mean
number of premises for companies within the core
and periphery groups were 70 and 10, respectively,
reflecting the typical size of a poultry company within
the respective network groups. These data regarding
company size informed the number of MS premises
within population 1 (n1,MS=70) and population 2
(n2,MS=10). The mean number of SS premises (nSS)
in the proximity of MS premises (nMS) was determined
for each population across varying distance radii, cor-
responding with assumptions considered for airborne
transmission of HPAI. Results are shown for 1 km
radii (corresponding with airborne transmission up
to 1 km) where nSS<nMS (n1,SS=35 for population
1 and n2,SS=5 for population 2).
Transmission mechanisms
Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of the
model structure. Two mechanisms at the farm-level
that could potentially allow for HPAI introduction
onto a farm are: (i) onto-farm movements related to
the catching and transportation of birds to the slaugh-
terhouse (i.e. both the catching team and slaughter-
house vehicle components of these on-farm visits),
referred to hereafter as ‘network-mediated links’,
and (ii) airborne or environmental spread, referred
to hereafter as ‘spatially mediated links’.
Network-mediated links between farms occurring
through slaughterhouses and catching companies
were inferred from the PND (n=3044 farms) as de-
scribed previously [see 11]. Spatially mediated links
between farms through proximity were inferred from
the geographical locations provided by the PND
(n=3153) and the Great Britain Poultry Register
(n=1991). The threshold for spatially mediated links
was varied in a sensitivity analysis due to a poor under-
standing of the likely distance for airborne spread
in GB. For most farms, the between-farm distances
were relatively large (>150 km), although 67% of
farms had at least one neighbour within 3 km suggest-
ing there is potential for airborne transmission
between these premises. Based on the experience of
The Netherlands, which was afflicted by a major out-
break of HPAI in 2003, evidence of meaningful trans-
mission beyond 10 km is limited [19, 20], therefore
we considered distances from 1 km to 10 km and pre-
sent results for 1 km.
Within a population, MS premises could transmit
infection to other MS premises, as well as to SS prem-
ises via both network and spatial links. MS premises
could also transmit infection within their company,
representing transmission via shared staff and equip-
ment [21]. Similarly, SS premises could transmit to
other SS premises as well as to MS premises within
the same population via both network and spatial
links. Between-population transmission events were
assumed to only occur via network links, reflecting
the observation that MS premises were less likely to
be within close proximity of the MS premises of
another company, thereby limiting the potential for
airborne spread.
Informing contact heterogeneity
Pairwise matrices summarizing the links between
premises via network-mediated and spatially mediated
mechanisms of contact were used to determine the
proportions of contact, both within and between popu-
lations, in the metapopulation model. Specifically, σjk
is the proportion of all spatially mediated links from
premises of type k to premises of type j, ωjk is the
ρ = 1
SS
MS MS MS MS
SS SS SS SS
SS
ρ = 2
ω +σ
ω +σ +θ ω +σ +θ
ω +σ ω +σ
ω +σ
Ωυ
Ωυ
Ωυ
Fig. 2. Schematic of the metapopulation model. The
compartment populations represent the multi-site (MS)
premises associated with a company from the network
core (ρ=1) and the network periphery (ρ=2), and the
single-site (SS) premises within proximity. Solid arrows=
within-population links; dashed arrows=between-popu-
lation links; Ω=between-population network link weights;
υ=between-population interaction strength; ω=within-
population network link weights; θ=company-related
network link weights and σ=within-population spatial
link weights. See Table 1 for full parameter details. Note
that this schematic does not reflect the actual relative num-
bers of MS and SS premises assumed in these analyses.
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Table 1. SIR metapopulation model notation, parameters and initial conditions
Parameter Definition Initial/default values/ranges
Reference/
source
n1,MS Total number of multi-site premises within population 1 70 PND
n2,MS Total number of multi-site premises within population 2 10 PND
n1,SS Total number of single-site premises within population 1 35 PND
n2,SS Total number of single-site premises within population 2 5 PND
nˉMS Median number of multi-site premises across all populations 15 PND
nˉSS Median number of single-site premises across all populations 8 PND
β Between-farm transmission rate (days−1) assuming density-independence 0·01–0·2, increments of 0·00255 [23–25]
β′ Between-farm transmission rate (days−1) assuming density-dependence* 0·0063–0·93, increments of 0·00255 –
γ Rate at which infected farms were depopulated (days−1) 0·17, 0·25 or 0·33 [23, 24]
ωjk Within-population proportion of network links from premises of type k to j, where j,k={MS, SS} See Table 2 PND
θ Within-population proportion of network links between MS premises only (i.e. within-company links) 1 Fixed†
σjk Within-population proportion of spatial links from premises of type k to j, where j,k={MS, SS} See Table 2 PND
Ωjk Between-population proportion of network links from premises of type k to j, where j,k={MS, SS} See Table 2 PND
ν Between-population interaction strength 0–10, increments of 0·1335 Fixed†
δjk Kronecker delta function used to ensure θ only applies to transmission within a company 0, if j=SS 1, if j=MS −
Wρj Within-population force of infection acting on premises j within population ρ – Simulated
Bρj Between-population force of infection acting on premises j within population ρ – Simulated
PND, Poultry network database; MS, multi-site premises; SS, single-site premises.
* This parameter was informed by β, nˉj and nρj.
†These parameters were fixed; an assessment of model sensitivity found these parameters to have little impact on the qualitative model results.
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proportion of all network-mediated links within a
compartment population from premises of type k to
premises of type j and Ωjk is the proportion of all
network-mediated links between compartment popu-
lations from premises of type k to premises of type j
(where j, k take values MS premises or SS premises).
Appendix A in the Supplementary online material
provides further details of how these link-type prob-
abilities were scaled to the distribution of MS premises
and SS premises according to the more demographi-
cally representative Great Britain Poultry Register
(see [11] for details regarding demographic biases
in the PND). These link-type probabilities were used
to apply a weighting to the transmission rates in the
Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model (described
below). All network and spatial links were assumed to
be active at any given time; in the case of the network
links, this is equivalent to assuming that visits are rela-
tively frequent compared to infectious periods, and
infectious connections between associated premises
are random. As this approximates many of the proper-
ties of homogeneous mixing within groups [22], the
model therefore provides an insight into outbreak
risk under a scenario of maximal connectivity between
poultry premises.
Link-type probabilities are later used to weight
the transmission rates informing heterogeneous mix-
ing within and between populations in the metapopu-
lation model. Figure 3 shows all possible link-types for
a single population, comparing the two transmission
mechanisms. Network-mediated links were predomi-
nantly between SS premises, whereas for spatially
mediated links this was the least probable and links
between MS premises and SS premises predominated.
For MS premises, spatially mediated links to the MS
premises of another population (i.e. between-company)
was relatively more probable than with MS premises
of the same company for distances up to 3 km.
The SIR models
Disease transmission over the metapopulation model
was implemented using a deterministic SIR com-
partmental framework. The total number of premises
within each infection state per premises type and popu-
lation were tracked throughout the duration of an
outbreak. The transition to compartment ‘R’ represen-
ted disease detection and subsequent total flock de-
population following the implementation of con-
trol measures which was assumed to occur at rate γ
(days−1). Once premises reached this status, they
posed no further transmission risk to other premises
through either network or spatial mechanisms. We
considered a range of values for γ (0·33, 0·25, 0·17
day−1), given by the reciprocal of anticipated farm-
level infectious periods, ranging 3–6 days consistent
with previous models of the between-farm spread of
avian influenza in GB [23, 24]. It was assumed that
repopulation of premises occurred outside of the time-
frame of an outbreak.
The baseline model for the interaction between
population 1 (network core group) and population 2
(network periphery group) is described by the follow-
ing set of ordinary differential equations:
dSpj
dt
= −Spj(Wpj + Bpj),
dI pj
dt
= Spj(Wpj + Bpj) − γI pj,
dRpj
dt
= γI pj,
where ρ={1, 2} for population 1 (network core) and
population 2 (network periphery) and j={MS, SS}
for multi-site and single-site premises types and Wρj
and Bρj represent the within- and between-population
forces of infection acting upon premises type j within
population ρ.
The force of infection acting on j=MS premises
within ρ=1 (network core group) is further decon-
structed as follows:
W1,MS = β ωMS,MS I1,MSn1,MS + ωMS,SS
I1,SS
n1,SS
( )
+ β1,MS′ σMS,MS
I1,MS
n1,MS
+ σMS,SS I1,SSn1,SS
( )
+ β θδMS,1 I1,MSn1,MS
( )
(a) (b)
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
SS
SS
SS
SS
Fig. 3 [colour online]. Schematic of the relative link-type
weights. (a) network-mediated links, (b) spatially mediated
links (representing proximities ranging 1–10 km). The
premises types are represented by multi-site (MS) and
single-site (SS) premises. Relative arrow sizes represent the
link-type weights for the corresponding transmission
mechanism (see Table 2).
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B1,MS = β ΩMS,MSν I2,MSn2,MS
( )
+ β ΩMS,SSν I2,SSn2,SS
( )
,
where β and β′1,MS are density-independent and
density-dependent transmission rates (days−1), respec-
tively, σMS,k and ωMS,k weight the rate of transmission
from premises type k={MS, SS} to MS premises
through spatial proximity and network links res-
pectively, θ weights the rate of transmission between
MS premises of the same company, δMS,1 is the
Kronecker delta function, where δjk=1 if j=MS pre-
mises or zero otherwise, ΩMS,k weights the rate of
transmission between populations and υ is a uniform
weighting applied to ΩMS,k in order to vary the rela-
tive strength of transmission between populations
(i.e. the interaction, or coupling, strength). These
equations can equivalently represent the force of
infection acting on SS premises by substituting
j=SS premises and for population 2 by substituting
ρ=2.
The density-dependent transmission rate β′ρj is
given by (β/nˉj)nρj where the density-independent
transmission rate β (days−1) is now proportional to
the number of premises of type j within population
ρ (nρj) and is further scaled by an overall median num-
ber of j premises (nˉj) across all populations ρ. Given
the lack of experience of large HPAI outbreaks in
GB, and therefore the uncertainty in the pathogen’s
likely transmissibility, we explored a range of trans-
mission rates (0·0063–0·93 day−1) that generated
basic reproduction numbers (R0) ranging from
<1 to 8 in accordance with the published literature
investigating potential outbreaks of HPAI in GB, as
well as the experiences of other countries [23–25].
Table 1 provides further details of the parameter
values explored in these analyses.
Although the likely mode of transmission of HPAI
within GB is not well understood, our model was
insensitive to the distance assumed for spatial trans-
mission except under density-dependent transmission.
We therefore present results for this scenario to
demonstrate the potential for disease spread under
maximal possible airborne spread for the distances
considered. The overall potential for an epidemic
of HPAI was represented by the between-farm R0,
computed as the dominant eigenvalue of the Next
Generation Matrix for the ODE model system.
Further details of the calculation of R0 are provided
in Appendix B (Supplementary online material).
Defining control models
The baseline model described above was adapted to
assess the risk of an outbreak under compartmentali-
zation. To provide practical insight, this risk was
assessed through a relative comparison with a zoning
control scenario. Figure 4 shows the outbreak inter-
ventions assumed. For compartmentalization, all net-
work links within and between compartments were
inhibited; however, the possibility remained of infec-
tion spillover between compartments and SS premises
within proximity. Therefore we use a global value of
R0 as a measure of when these spillovers may have a
Table 2. Between-premises link-type probabilities via network and spatial mechanisms
Link type*
Network
(ω and Ω)†
Network >10 km
(ω and Ω)† ‡
Spatial (σ):
0–1 km†
Spatial (σ):
0–3 km†
Spatial (σ):
0–10 km†
jk=MS, MS§ 0·366 0·389 0·088 0·043 0·020
jk=MS, MS¶ 0·008 0·010 –∥ –∥ –∥
jk=MS, SS 0·431 0·450 0·373 0·362 0·247
jk=SS, MS 0·360 0·353 0·449 0·567 0·744
jk=SS, SS 0·879 0·842 0·0002 0·0002 0·0002
* jk represents all possible link-types between premises types j={MS, SS} and k={MS, SS}, where jk=MS, MS represents
links between multi-site premises, jk=MS,SS and jk=SS,MS represents links between multi-site and single-site premises;
jk=SS, SS represents links between single-site premises.
† See Appendix A (Supplementary material) for further details of how link-type probabilities were scaled to the expected dis-
tribution of multi-site and single-site premises according to the Great Britain Poultry Register. The scaled link-type probabil-
ities were used to apply a weighting to the transmission rates in the SIR model.
‡Used to inform network links under zoning in the control scenarios (see ‘R0 thresholds: compartmentalization’ section).
§Within-compartment (or within company).
¶ Between compartment (or between companies).
∥No spatial links occurred between compartment populations.
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widespread impact. These conditions were motivated
by the OIE guidelines for the epidemiological separ-
ation of compartments. The guideline for GB com-
partments specifies a minimum distance of 400m
to other premises [26]. Given that it is possible that
airborne spread of HPAI could occur at distances
beyond 400 m (based on the experience of other coun-
tries [19, 20, 27]), we explored the impact of allowing
spatially mediated transmission to occur at distances
>400 m.
In contrast, under zoning all spatial links, network-
mediated links within 10 km and within-company
links were inhibited thereby mitigating all trans-
mission risks operating at relatively short distances.
The purpose of zoning control is to enforce enhanced
biosecurity and to limit movement of poultry between
affected and non-affected areas (generally, in the case
of HPAI, 3 km protection zones and 10 km surveil-
lance zones are implemented which enforce different
levels of restrictions [2]). The zoning scenario in
these analyses corresponds to a specific situation
where infection is assumed to have already spread
beyond 10 km surveillance zones through the move-
ments of fomites (i.e. people, vehicles, equipment),
prior to the enforcement of control measures follow-
ing identification of the index premises (see
Table 2 for network link-type probabilities under
zoning).
R0 THRESHOLDS: BASELINE MODEL
Figure 5 shows R0=1 thresholds for varying values
of the transmission rate (β) and between-population
interaction strength (υ). Parameter combinations
above each line (i.e. where R0>1), indicate the poten-
tial for an outbreak, while parameter combinations
below each line (i.e. where R0<1) indicate no outbreak
potential. Each line corresponds to a different out-
break (informed by β) and control measure (informed
by υ) scenario; the link types enabling a between-
population interaction are represented by line colour,
and the premises-level infectious periods (1/γ) are
represented by line type.
The clustering of lines by colour shows that out-
break risk was most sensitive to the link types enabling
between-population transmission and relatively less
sensitive to the premises-level infectious period (1/γ).
Transmission between poultry companies (i.e. ΩMS)
alone was sufficient for R0 >1; additional transmission
involving SS premises (i.e. ΩMS, ΩSM or ΩSS) further
enhanced this, an effect which increased with the in-
teraction strength (υ). There was also little sensitivity
to the assumed distances for spatially mediated links
(see Table 2).
Figure 6 demonstrates how the nonlinear relation-
ship between R0, β and υ enables the epidemic thresh-
old to be exceeded for relatively small changes to
parameter values. For example, for incremental
decreases from high values of β, only relatively small
increases to υ were required to maintain the system
above the epidemic threshold (Fig. 6a). The converse
was also true; incremental decreases from high values
of υ only requiring a small increase in β to maintain
the epidemic threshold (Fig. 6b).
R0 THRESHOLDS:
COMPARTMENTALIZATION
Compartmentalization and zoning produce different
characteristics for the epidemic threshold, as shown
schematically in Figure 7. The different areas under
the curves represent the difference in risk; the ad-
ditional risk due to compartmentalization is shown
by the dark-shaded region, while the additional risk
from zoning is shown by the light-shaded region.
Figure 8 overlays the R0 thresholds corresponding
to compartmentalization (black horizontal lines) and
zoning (coloured curves) to identify the parameter
space where additional risk could be attributed to
compartmentalization (see Fig. 7). Note that there is
(a) Compartmentalization (b) Zoning
SS SS
SS
SS
SSSS
SS
SS
MS MS
MS MS MS MS
MS MS
σ+θ
σ+θ
σ ω ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
Ωυ Ωυ Ωυ
ω
ω
ω
ωω
ω
σ
σ
σσ
σ σ
σ
σ
σ
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of zoning and compart-
mentalization control scenarios. (a) Under compartmen-
talization the following links were enabled: spatial and
within-company links (σ, θ). (b) Under zoning control the
following links were enabled: within-population network-
mediated links (beyond 10 km) and between-population
network links (ω, Ωυ).
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no sensitivity to υ under compartmentalization as
between-population transmission is inhibited. A rela-
tively greater risk under compartmentalization was
found when: (a) removing the links enabling between-
population interactions (i.e. decreasing the risk under
zoning), or (b) increasing the infectious period. The
impact of link types was greater than the infectious
period, as shown by comparing the relative difference
in arrow lengths in Figure 8a (for changes to the link
types, Ω) and Figure 8b (for changes to the farm-level
infectious period, 1/γ).
Although a greater risk for compartmentali-
zation was found when fewer link types enabled
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Fig. 5. Sensitivity of R0 thresholds to farm-level parameters. γ=rate of premises depopulation (small=0·17 day
−1,
medium=0·25 day−1, large=0·33 day−1; ΩMM= links between multi-site premises, ΩMS and ΩSM=links between multi-site
and single-site premises; ΩSS=links between single-site premises. Link types not shown in the legend are switched-off
(i.e. Ω=0). This model scenario assumed density-dependent spatial transmission occurred within a distance radius of 1 km.
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Fig. 6 [colour online]. Schematic representation of how
parameter trade-offs maintain outbreak potential. (a)
When decreasing from high β (blue lines), only relatively
small increases to υ maintains the R0 threshold, compared
to decreases from small values of β (green lines). (b) When
decreasing from high υ (blue lines), only relatively small
increases to β maintains the R0 threshold, compared to
decreases from small values of υ (green lines).
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Fig. 7. Schematic representation of the relative risk of in-
fection spillover under compartmentalization. Dark-shaded
area represents the additional risk of an outbreak (where
R0>1) under compartmentalization and light-shaded area
represents the additional risk of an outbreak (where R0>1)
under zoning. The relative risk under compartmentaliza-
tion can be increased through two ways: (i) a rightwards
shift to the curve under zoning or (ii) a downwards shift
to the line under compartmentalization.
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between-population spread under zoning, the converse
is also true; should zoning control be ineffective
in inhibiting the risk of spread between populations
through network links (i.e. because these connect
many premises outside defined zones), compartmenta-
lization would be a relatively more effective measure
for protecting against an outbreak.
DISCUSSION
Compartmentalization is a concept which could have
major implications for poultry industries. However,
there are no data to support its application during
an outbreak, and so the refinement of its definition
and exploration of its potential efficacy warrants
further attention. In particular, the definition of epi-
demiological links and minimum distances to
neighbouring farms could be made more specific
through quantification of risk based on empirical
data informing the structure of a specific poultry
industry.
Our analysis centred on the fundamental structure
underpinning poultry production in GB, as repre-
sented by a metapopulation of linked poultry com-
pany compartments and the SS premises within
proximity. We used this modelling framework to
assess the potential for an outbreak involving a
compartment by quantifying the basic reproduction
number, R0. While demographic stochasticity can be
important in small populations, here we aimed to
compare the relative potential for an outbreak under
compartmentalization and zoning control; it was not
our intention to assess the absolute risk of an outbreak
occurring under one of these measures alone.
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Fig. 8. R0 thresholds under zoning (coloured curves) vs. compartmentalization (black lines). ΩMM=links between multi-site
premises, ΩMS and ΩSM=links between multi-site and single-site premises; ΩSS= links between single-site premises. (a) For
a medium infectious period corresponding to a premises depopulation rate of 0·25 (day−1), relative risk under
compartmentalization was increased when the links enabling between-population interaction were reduced (from red to
green to blue), as indicated by the arrow. Link types not shown in the legend are switched-off (i.e. Ω=0). (b) For
between-population interactions involving multi-site and single-site premises (i.e. ΩMS, ΩSM, ΩSS), the relative risk
increased with the infectious period (from solid to dotted lines) under compartmentalization (black arrow) and zoning
(green arrow). This model scenario assumed density-dependent spatial transmission occurred within a distance radius
of 1 km.
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Ideally, these analyses should differentiate the
different outbreak risks expected across poultry indus-
try sectors (particularly layer hens and broiler chick-
ens; Nick Sparks, personal communication). Indeed,
previous analyses have highlighted the role of layer
producers in the high farm-level network connectivity
in GB through slaughterhouses and catching com-
panies [11]. With respect to the poultry company-level
network described here, the mean number of possible
associated companies was similar between companies
involved with layer and broiler production (29 and 26
company associations, respectively), although we
note that layers had a greater minimum number
(range 24–36 for layers vs. 2–36 for broilers).
With respect to farm-level network links, we
focused on those between premises through catching
teams and slaughterhouses as they are recognized to
be of high risk for disease transmission within the
GB poultry industry (during flock-thinning) and so
our analyses largely reflect the commercial broiler
chicken sector [9]. No data were available for other
potential links between premises such as through
feed delivery or egg collections in relation to layer
hens. These additional links could also present epi-
demiological risks and could be added to future
analyses concerning compartmentalization should
national-level data describing these movements be-
come available.
Regardless of production type, integrated poultry
companies may be considered of low risk of dissemi-
nating infection through fomite-mediated mechanisms
to external premises. However, we have identified
links between different companies through shared
slaughterhouse and catching companies at the farm
level. This indicates the potential for disease trans-
mission from these companies should compartmenta-
lization be defined on the basis of shared ownership.
By comparing the sensitivity of R0 across different
farm-level factors, we found that outbreak risk was
most sensitive to the type of links between populations
(Fig. 5). The relatively greater probability of network
links from a poultry company to external single sites
(Fig. 3, Table 2) highlights the importance of con-
sidering these external premises when assessing the
risk of disease spread from a compartment.
The ability to produce risk profiles for premises
in this way is valuable when resources are restricted
and their distribution must be prioritized. For exam-
ple, R0 was relatively more sensitive to link-types
(Ω) than to the farm-level infectious period (1/γ).
This suggests that measures to restrict link types,
representing industry-related movements, may have
a greater impact on outbreak potential compared to
the speed of outbreak detection. However, as restrict-
ing slaughterhouse or catching-team clientele to re-
duce between-farm connectivity may not be feasible,
a more useful application might be to direct resources
to forwards and backwards contact tracing during an
outbreak.
When considering the potential effect of targeting
control measures at network links, the nonlinear
relationship between transmission rate (β) and interac-
tion strength (υ) highlights how outbreak risk might be
maintained even when the transmission rate is reduced
(Fig. 6). Control measures that influence one aspect of
transmission risk could alter another should farmers’
respond to control measures with compensatory be-
haviour. These results imply the long-term impact
could require further investigation if movement re-
strictions (which could alter β, υ or both) were to be
a condition for compartmentalization.
Poultry companies typically locate their premises
out of close proximity to one another, or to other non-
company premises, to meet biosecurity requirements
(Nick Sparks, personal communication); however,
quantitative evidence supporting the minimum inter-
farm distance of 400 m in the GB guidelines [26] is
lacking. Our results show that even if all network
links were to be inhibited under compartmentali-
zation, the risk of an outbreak may be maintained
via spatially mediated airborne spread alone (Fig. 8).
Outbreak conditions were found where the risk was
relatively greater under compartmentalization than
under zoning control (where instead spatial links
were inhibited). We could not have predicted that
the risk under zoning control would decrease as the
risk under compartmentalization increased for our
combination of parameter ranges.
Although most between-farm distances were large
(>10 km), and R0 was relatively insensitive to spatial
separation of farms, the sensitivity of R0 was heigh-
tened under density-dependence and resulted in the
potential for relatively greater risk through compart-
mentalization compared to zoning control. This rela-
tively greater risk under compartmentalization was
found for airborne transmission within a distance of
1 km – only a short increase above the current recom-
mended minimum distance of 400 m for compart-
ments in GB [28]. At this relatively short distance,
multi-site farms were more likely to be in the proxim-
ity of other multi-site farms external to their company.
With greater knowledge of the likely transmissibility
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of HPAI in GB, as well as farm-level biosecurity
practices, our analysis could provide a framework to
inform evidence-based criteria for compartments in
GB. Furthermore, this framework could be used as
a decision-making tool in the event of an outbreak
to inform whether compartmentalization is preferable
to zoning as a control measure against HPAI.
CONCLUSIONS
The current requirements enabling farms to achieve
compartment status are not specific to a country’s
poultry industry structure, or to the likely mechanism
enabling epidemiological links between farms. Our
analyses highlight the potential for infection spread
from compartments via: (i) epidemiologically relevant
network links between premises of unrelated com-
panies and (ii) through airborne spread to single-site
premises in proximity. With greater knowledge of
the likely transmissibility of HPAI in GB, these analy-
ses could help define an appropriate evidence-based
minimum between-farm distance to inform more
specific guidelines for compartmentalization in GB.
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